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Abstract. This paper questions the idea that theism can function as an 
explanatory hypothesis to account for the nature and origins of the cosmos. 
Invoking God cannot dissolve the mystery of existence, and the characteristic 
religious response here is one of awe and humility. I then address David 
e. Cooper’s challenge of showing how a  ‘doctrine of mystery’ can have any 
discursible content. It is argued that certain aspects of our human experience (of 
the wonders of nature and art and the demands of morality) afford us glimpses 
of the divine nature – intimations of the transcendent, which shine through 
from the ineffable source of our being to the human world we inhabit.1
I. SeCulArISm, SCIeNCe, AND THe lImITS oF eXPlANATIoN
Against all expectation, and in defiance of the naturalist orthodoxy that 
rules over much professional academic philosophy, religion is firmly 
back on the agenda in our contemporary intellectual culture. Despite the 
vehemence of today’s militant atheists, indeed partly perhaps as a result 
of that very vehemence, many thinking people have begun to ask if the 
relentless secularism of the last few years may not have overreached itself. 
To be sure, it can be readily conceded to the militant critics that much 
institutionalised religion has been, and often still is, sectarian, intolerant, 
1 This paper takes further some of the themes in a presentation I gave in June 2011 at 
a one-day workshop at the university of Durham devoted to the work of David Cooper 
and myself, on the theme ‘mystery, Humility and religious Practice’. I am most grateful 
to Guy bennett-Hunter and Ian Kidd for their initiative in planning and organizing that 
event, and for their own contributions to the discussion on that occasion, from which 
I have learned much, as I have from perceptive questions and comments of the other 
participants in the workshop, not least David Cooper himself.
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dogmatic (in the bad sense), corrupt, exploitative, and worse; but the 
sense remains among many thinking people that something precious 
remains beneath all the dross. What exactly is that precious something?
one way of answering this is by reference to the notion of the 
‘spiritual’. This term is often used in contemporary culture to refer to 
aspirations and sensibilities of an especially powerful and profound kind, 
that take us beyond our ordinary routine existence and afford a glimpse 
into something more rich and meaningful.2 So a deep appreciation of 
the wonders of nature or the transforming qualities of great art may be 
described as bringing a ‘spiritual’ element into our lives. The ‘depth’ that 
is in question here is not easy to specify precisely, but it seems to have 
something to do with our human aspiration to ‘transcend ourselves’ – 
to seek for something beyond the gratifications and dissatisfactions of 
everyday living and locate our lives within a more enduring framework 
of meaning. Those who favour the term ‘spiritual’ perhaps intend to 
signal their commitment to some of these aspirations, while distancing 
themselves from the doctrinal assumptions or institutional structures of 
organized religion (this seems to be the point of the T-shirt reportedly 
seen on some campuses bearing the slogan ‘I’m not religious but I’m 
spiritual’). but however it is labelled, the religious or ‘spiritual’ impulse 
cannot be entirely eradicated, for it seems to spring from yearnings deep 
within our nature that we cannot ignore – yearnings that cannot be 
satisfied by the brave new world of secularism, or by the onward march 
of scientific and technological progress.
It is not a question of turning the clock back to pre-enlightenment 
times: we all have reason to be deeply grateful to the clear light of 
scientific reason for freeing us from superstition and ignorance, as well 
as for contributing immeasurably to the quality of our lives (one only 
has to think of the debt so many of us or our loved ones owe to the 
advances of modern medicine and surgery). And indeed, not just in its 
practical benefits, but in the grandeur of its aspirations and the hard-won 
precision and rigour of its methods, science surely ranks among the very 
greatest achievements of the human spirit. but there is also something 
in the human spirit that reaches beyond what science can deliver. even 
were science and technology to secure optimal conditions for a healthy 
and secure human existence, even were it to formulate covering laws that 
2 For more on this, see John Cottingham, ‘Theism and Spirituality’, forthcoming in 
V. Harrison, S. Goetz, and C. Taliaferro (eds), The Routledge Companion to Theism.
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fully described the operation of the macro and micro worlds, and even 
were it to unify these laws with supreme simplicity and elegance into the 
elusive ‘Toe’, the grand ‘Theory of everything’, it would still not be in 
our nature as human beings to draw a line and say ‘So that wraps it all up, 
then!’ As blaise Pascal observed in the seventeenth century, ‘l’homme 
passe l’homme’ – ‘man goes beyond himself ’, or ‘humanity transcends 
itself ’.3 To be human is to see that we are somehow incomplete beings, 
advancing to a horizon that always recedes from view. And this is not 
a scientific, but a metaphysical or a religious truth about us. In the words 
of T. S. eliot, writing in the depths of the Second World War, centuries 
away from the cultural milieu of Pascal yet sharing something of the 
restlessness of his religious vision: ‘We shall not cease from exploration.’4
If you agree with me, or rather with eliot and Pascal, that this kind 
of restlessness is at the heart of the religious impulse,5 then it may seem 
somewhat surprising that many leading approaches in contemporary 
philosophy of religion tend to discuss religious belief in a  way that 
bypasses it altogether. So far from conceiving the religious adherent 
as a  restless pilgrim, reaching towards something mysterious that 
transcends the boundaries of human comprehension, many philosophers 
apparently see the believer as calmly and dispassionately accepting 
a precisely formulated hypothesis which does in principle the same kind 
of explanatory work as that found in science, except at a more general 
and abstract level. To be a theist, on this view, is to subscribe to ‘the God 
hypothesis’ (as its fierce detractor richard Dawkins terms it),6 namely 
the hypothesis that the universe came into being as a  result of being 
willed to exist by an immortal, immaterial spirit with certain specified 
properties, including maximal power and knowledge. Given the nature 
of the universe as we find it, positing such a God is, according to the 
eminent philosopher of religion richard Swinburne, the ‘most probable 
explanation’ of its existence.7
3 blaise Pascal, Pensées [c. 1660], ed. l. lafuma (Paris: editions du Seuil, 1962), no. 131.
4 T. S. eliot, ‘little Gidding’ [1942], in Four Quartets [1945] (london: Faber, 1959), line 239.
5 The thought is perhaps as old as humanity, and in any case goes back way before 
Pascal; compare St Augustine of Hippo, Confessions [Confessiones, c. 398], book I, Ch. 1.
6 richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (london: bantam books, 2006), Ch. 2.
7 ‘[T]he most probable explanation of the existence of the universe and its most 
general features is that they are caused by God. These most general features include the 
universal operation of simple laws of nature ... those laws and the initial (or boundary) 
conditions of the universe being such as to bring about the existence of human bodies, 
and humans being conscious beings , open to a finite amount of suffering and having 
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It is, I suppose, theoretically conceivable that further rational 
discussion will eventually settle the dispute between the opposing 
sides of the argument represented by the two thinkers just mentioned, 
Dawkins and Swinburne; but it has to be said that the present state of 
play appears to be a  deadlock (in a  sense, perhaps, the two sides are 
perfect foils for each other). one side maintains that modern science 
is the only valid method of investigating the nature and origins of 
the cosmos, and appears to look with genuine incomprehension and 
exasperation upon  the interference of theologians and philosophers 
who presume to muddy the waters with their theistic speculations. The 
other side presumably feels baffled that their rigorous and meticulously 
deployed arguments for a  personal creator fail to convince opponents 
that (as Swinburne puts it) ‘the hypothesis of theism satisfies the criteria 
of correct explanation [simplicity, and ability to account for the relevant 
data] better than does any rival explanation’.8
It is no part of my purpose to denigrate this latter approach; anyone who 
reads Swinburne’s work must acknowledge its philosophical integrity and 
the luminous clarity of the arguments offered. but I cannot help feeling, 
nonetheless, that the ‘explanatory hypothesis’ approach to God has little 
connection with the religious impulse as it typically operates in human 
life. I do not deny that some potential believers may be encouraged by 
the thought that certain features of the universe might seem to make 
God’s existence more probable; but the restless ‘transcendent’ impulses 
of the kind I was discussing a moment ago in connection with Pascal and 
eliot are not, it seems to me, of the kind to be satisfied by probabilistic 
calculations; they belong in an entirely different arena.
Speaking for my own part, I am inclined to agree with the Dominican 
writer Herbert mcCabe, that ‘to say that God created the world is in no 
way to eliminate the intellectual vertigo we feel when we try to think 
of the beginning of things’. ‘recognition of God’s action’, mcCabe goes 
on, ‘does not remove any mystery from the world.’9 or as he puts it 
some ability to bear it or alleviate it.’ richard Swinburne, ‘God as the Simplest explanation 
of the universe’, in Anthony o’Hear (ed.), Philosophy and Religion, royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 68 (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2011), 3-24 (p. 11).
8 Swinburne, ‘God as the Simplest explanation’, p. 11.
9 Herbert mcCabe, God and Evil in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas [1957] (london: 
Continuum, 2010), p. 102. Compare, in a rather different vein, the argument of William 
Charlton that there is no proper scope for the idea of a causal explanation of the universe 
itself. Charlton goes on to suggest that God’s responsibility for the cosmos is more akin to 
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elsewhere: ‘When we speak of God we do not clear up a puzzle, we draw 
attention to a mystery.’10 It seems to me best to follow mcCabe, and to 
start by accepting our helplessness in the face of the stupendous enigma 
that is the existing cosmos. The primal human existential response – of 
vertigo, of terror, of wonder, of awe – this (as I see it) is the well-spring 
of spirituality, the basis of the religious impulse. or, if I may revert to 
‘little Gidding’, since no one I think has put it better than T. S. eliot: 
You are not here to verify, 
Instruct yourself, or inform curiosity, 
or to carry report. You are here to kneel ...11
Yet of course when we are operating in the mode of scientific 
inquiry, we are precisely here in order to verify and instruct ourselves. 
And the drive to understand, and to satisfy our human curiosity, is 
a  wholly legitimate one: the pursuit of truth by means of the ‘natural 
light’ of reason, as rené Descartes put it, is part of what we are here 
for. (Descartes himself followed a long tradition in regarding rationality 
and the thirst for knowledge as divinely bestowed endowments.) but 
Descartes (again following a long tradition) was also quite clear that the 
ultimate divine reality underlying the natural world is beyond human 
comprehension. God, for Descartes, is like a  mountain which we can 
approach, and somehow touch in our thought, but which we can never 
encompass, can never put our arms round.12 And it is this essential, and 
authentically religious, acknowledgement of the ultimate mysteriousness 
of reality that should, it seems to me, be our guide here.
For how much, after all, is really explained by supposing that the 
cosmos was created by a  powerful and all-knowing immaterial spirit? 
Calling God ‘immaterial’, to begin with, solves nothing: our bafflement 
moral than to causal responsibility. See W. Charlton, ‘The Doctrine of Creation’, Heythrop 
Journal, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 2008), 620-31.
10 mcCabe, God and Evil, p. 128.
11 eliot, ‘little Gidding’, lines 43-45.
12 rené Descartes, letter to mersenne of 27 may 1630, in The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, Vol. III, The Correspondence, transl. J. Cottingham, r. Stoothoff, D. murdoch 
and A. Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, l991), p. 25: Just as we can 
‘touch a mountain but not put our arms around it’, so ‘we can know that God is infinite 
and all-powerful, even though our soul, being finite, cannot comprehend or conceive 
him’. The typical understanding of Descartes’s approach to God as being based entirely 
on transparent rational reasoning is in my view something of a distortion; see further 
J. Cottingham, ‘Sceptical Detachment or loving Submission to the Good: reason, Faith 
and the Passions in Descartes’, Faith and Philosophy, 28:1 (January 2011), 44-53.
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at how a  divine being could exercise unlimited power throughout the 
cosmos, unconstrained by the limitations of time and space and place, 
shows, no doubt, that the deity cannot be conceived on the model of 
any physical object we can imagine; but to think that our understanding 
is somehow assuaged by pronouncing that the Deity is ‘incorporeal’ – 
a Cartesian-style ghost – is surely to delude oneself. Nicolas malebranche 
seems to have been nearer the mark in his Recherche de la Vérité when he 
stressed how far the deity must wholly transcend any human conceptions. 
Just as   we should not imagine God to be corporeal, malebranche 
observed, so we should not really describe him as a  mind or Spirit, 
since that invites comparison with a human mind. rather, malebranche 
suggested, we should think that ‘just as He contains within himself the 
perfections of matter without being material ... so He also comprehends 
the perfections of created spirits without being a mind, in the way we 
conceive of minds’.13
but the reasons why I think ‘the God hypothesis’ fails to count as 
an informative explanation run deeper. None of the features that puzzle 
us about reality – the mere fact of there being something rather than 
nothing, the baffling intricacy and organization of the cosmos, its 
mysterious ability to bring forth life, and eventually intelligence – none 
of this actually turns out to be less mysterious in virtue of positing God 
as its source. All that the theist is doing here is taking the baffling features 
– existence itself rather than non-existence, order rather than disorder, 
vivifying power and consciousness rather than their opposites – and 
inscribing them within a  (divine) reality that is taken already to have 
those properties from eternity. It is not that there is anything intrinsically 
absurd in making such an assertion; on the contrary, if theism is true, that 
is indeed how reality is. but we should not mistake such a metaphysical 
declaration for a  hypothesis with genuine explanatory power. If I am 
puzzled by the phenomenon of heat, or the fact of there being hot 
things at all, the puzzle will hardly be solved if someone triumphantly 
invokes an eternal primordial reality that is itself hot. or consider this 
analogy from Platonic metaphysics: if we say that ants exist because 
they are patterned after the eternal Form of Anthood, or that ants owe 
their antlike properties to participation in the Form of Ant which itself 
eternally possesses the antlike properties in perfect and paradigmatic 
13 Nicolas malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité [1674], bk. 3, Ch. 9, final paragraph; 
transl. T. lennon and P. olscamp (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1997), p. 251.
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fashion, such a  pronouncement, whatever its metaphysical merits 
(if any), cannot, on pain of circularity, discharge any explanatory burden 
in accounting for the reality of ants.14
but more important than this, the very attempt to close the book on 
the mystery of being seems somehow presumptuous. Indeed, the French 
philosopher and theologian Jean-luc marion makes an interesting case 
for the view that it amounts to idolatry:
God cannot be seen, not only because nothing finite can bear his glory 
without perishing, but above all because a God that could be conceptually 
comprehended would no longer bear the title ‘God’… God remains God 
only on condition that [our] ignorance be established and admitted 
definitively, every thing in the world gains by being known – but God 
who is not of the world, gains by not being known conceptually. The 
idolatry of the concept is the same as that of the gaze, imagining oneself 
to have attained God and to be capable of maintaining him under our 
gaze, like a thing of the world. And the revelation of God consists first of 
all in cleaning the slate of this illusion and its blasphemy. 15
marion’s thought seems to be somewhat as follows. How convenient it 
would be for our sense of security and self-esteem if we really could ‘wrap 
it all up’: looking out at the night sky, at the silence of those infinite spaces 
that terrified Pascal,16 we could calmly say: ‘No problem about any of 
that: it’s the work of an intelligent designer, a person, rather like us only 
much greater, but invisible and immaterial, who initiated the big bang, 
and structured the muons and neutrinos and all the rest so that in due 
course of time conscious beings like us would emerge.’ of course this is 
just how many theists would express their belief in God, and I’m not at 
all concerned to subvert that belief – far from it. What I am claiming, 
rather, is that it is a  fundamental mistake to construe the adoption of 
such a religious framework as part of the same kind of explanatory or 
14 Compare the ‘third man’ argument against Plato’s theory of Forms: Plato, Parmenides 
[c. 360 bC], 132 a-b. (The example in this passage actually concerns the form of largeness; 
Aristotle’s reference to this type of argument as ‘the third man’ occurs in his Metaphysics 
[c. 325 bC], 990b17.)
15 Jean-luc marion, ‘In the Name: How to Avoiding Speaking of “Negative Theology”’, 
in J. D. Caputo and m. J. Scanlon (eds), God, the Gift, and Postmodernism (bloomington: 
Indiana university Press, 1999), p. 34, emphasis supplied. marion’s point has a  long 
ancestry: compare St. Augustine’s Si comprehendis, non est Deus, (‘If you grasp him, he is 
not God.’), Sermones [392-430], 52, vi, 16 and 117, iii, 5.
16 blaise Pascal, Pensées [1670], ed. l. lafuma (Paris: Seuil, 1962), no. 206.
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puzzle-solving enterprise as science – or anything remotely like it.17 
The molecular biologist ursula Goodenough, in her remarkable book 
The Sacred Depths of Nature, strikes me as putting her finger on what is 
amiss about this way of construing belief in God, when she observes that 
‘the concept of a human-like creator of muons and neutrinos’ has, for her, 
no meaning; it fails to resonate with anything that looks remotely like 
a piece of explanatory science. but secondly (and closer to what I had in 
mind about presumption), she remarks that such a  construal of belief 
in God spoils her ‘covenant with mystery’. For Goodenough, ‘to assign 
attributes to mystery is to disenchant it, to take away its luminance.’18
There seems to be something undeniably right about this. We find 
ourselves in a profoundly mysterious world, a world of strangeness and 
awesome power and luminescent beauty. That is our human lot. To be 
religious is to acknowledge this with a  mixture of fear and exaltation 
and gratitude, not to wish it away, or vainly attempt to box it up or trim 
it down to something we can grasp and control and explain. If William 
James was right that ‘the whole concern of religion is with the manner of 
our acceptance of the universe’,19 then I would say that the distinctively 
religious mode of acceptance is that of humility and awe before the 
tremendous mystery of being.
II. INTImATIoNS oF THe TrANSCeNDeNT
Those familiar with the work of David Cooper will readily perceive 
from the foregoing that there are several key points of contact in our 
respective outlooks. In many of his writings, including the paper in the 
present symposium,20 Cooper underlines the importance of coming to 
terms with the mystery of existence, ‘living with mystery’, as he puts it. 
only a ‘doctrine of mystery’, he argues, will avoid the twin and opposed 
17 by ‘anything remotely like it’, I include metaphysics of the kind that purports to 
offer (not mere conceptual classification or clarification but) a  general description or 
explanation of the most fundamental aspects of reality. Compare Jonathan lowe, 
A Survey of Metaphysics (oxford: oxford university Press, 2002): the ‘central concern’ of 
metaphysics is with the ‘fundamental structure of reality as a whole’ (p. 3).
18 ursula Goodenough, The Sacred Depths of Nature (New York: oxford university 
Press, 1998), p. 12.
19 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience [1902], Ch. 2 (london: Fontana, 
1962), p. 58.
20 David e. Cooper, ‘living with mystery’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 
4/3 (2012), pp. 1-13.
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pitfalls of ‘humanism’ and ‘absolutism’. Humanism, succumbing to the 
fallacy of Protagoras (‘man is the measure of all things’),21 takes it that 
there can be no reality beyond what is describable in human terms, 
and so falls into the ‘hubristic posturing’ which supposes we are not 
answerable to any values except those derived from human ordinance or 
convention. Absolutism, by contrast, falls into the arrogance of thinking 
we have the capacity to attain to an objective conception of reality that 
somehow transcends the human perspective – that we have some kind of 
hot-line to the Truth ‘as it really is’. Avoiding these two extremes enables 
us to preserve our sense of mystery, thus giving ‘shape to a life in which 
virtues, like humility, have their place’.22
Starting from this common ground, it is clearly possible to move in 
very different directions. In my own case, I find the stance of humility 
towards the ‘mystery of being’ fully compatible with mainstream Judaeo-
Christian theism; while Cooper, in common with several interesting 
recent writers,23 turns his back on this heritage and adopts a worldview 
informed by insights from Daoism and buddhism. In the remainder of 
this paper, I should like to explore some of the problems that arise on each 
of these diverging paths, not in any spirit of polemicism (for anything like 
point-scoring would be highly distasteful in an area that touches people’s 
deepest emotions and allegiances), but in order to try to get clearer on 
what is involved espousing these divergent religious outlooks.
The first problem is one for the theist. To insist on the mysteriousness 
of ultimate reality, to underline our inability to comprehend it or describe 
it in human discourse, seems to risk sliding into mere agnosticism or 
scepticism. Something like this point was put with devastating force by 
David Hume, in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, where he 
has Cleanthes asking ‘How do you mystics, who maintain the absolute 
incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from sceptics or atheists, who assert 
21 The reference to Protagoras is mine, not Cooper’s, but I think he would readily 
acknowledge the Protagorean view as typifying the pretensions of what he dubs 
‘humanism’. Protagoras’s famous dictum is quoted in Plato, Protagoras [c. 390 bC] 80b1.
22 Cooper, ‘living with mystery’, p. 4.
23 other examples are michael mcGhee, Transformations of Mind (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2000); André Comte-Sponville, The Book of Atheist 
Spirituality [L’esprit de l’athéisme, 2006] (london: bantam, 2008); and mark Johnston, 
Saving God (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 2009). It would be an interesting 
study in the sociology of religion to explore the reasons or causes behind the rejection by 
these latter three philosophers, all brought up as Catholics, of the faith tradition in which 
they grew up, and their seeking solace elsewhere.
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that the first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible?’.24 Cleanthes goes 
on to say that such mystics ‘are, in a word, atheists without knowing it’.25 
The use of the term ‘atheist’ here seems misleading, at least if transferred 
to a modern context, since we now take the typical atheist to be one who 
firmly denies the possible or actual existence of any divine reality ‘behind’ 
or ‘beyond’ the natural world, whereas the stance under discussion, that 
of awe and humility before the mystery of being, simply asserts that the 
ultimate reality is not comprehensible in human terms. but the main 
point of Hume’s challenge remains: can the stance of uncomprehending 
awe coherently claim to have any genuine theistic content?
I think we can begin to see our way out of this conundrum if we take 
seriously ursula Goodenough’s observation that the role of religion is to 
provide a kind of integration of cosmology and morality.26 each of the 
great world religions appears to address two fundamental concerns: firstly 
how the universe came to be, and secondly what is our place within it 
and how we should live our lives. I have argued elsewhere that in a proper 
understanding of religion the second of these questions has priority over 
the first – in other words that we need to accept ‘primacy of praxis’ over 
theory when it comes to understanding what it is to be religious.27 To 
put the matter more explicitly: religious allegiance, I would suggest, 
is not primarily a  matter of intellectual assent to certain explanatory 
hypotheses about the nature or origins of the cosmos, or the acceptance 
of certain metaphysical claims about ultimate reality, but involves above 
all (to borrow some much misunderstood notions of Wittgenstein) 
a ‘passionate commitment’, which is inextricably bound up with a certain 
‘form of life’.28 The collective evidence of Scripture, which is a rich source 
for our grasp of what is involved in religious allegiance, is pretty clear 
24 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [c. 1755; first published 
posthumously, 1779], Part IV, §1; ed. H. D. Aiken (New York: Haffner, 1948), p. 31.
25 Hume, Dialogues, Part IV, §3. (ed. Aitken, p. 32).
26 Goodenough, Sacred Depths of Nature, p. xiv.
27 See John Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 2005), Ch. 4.
28 For a conspectus of the many passages where Wittgenstein discusses the importance 
of activity and ‘forms of life’, see H-J. Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (oxford: blackwell, 
1996), pp. 124-9. For the notion of ‘passionate commitment’, see l.  Wittgenstein, mS 
136 [1947], in Culture and Value (oxford: blackwell, 1998), p. 73. For some of the 
misunderstandings of these texts, in particular the tendency to interpret Wittgenstein’s 
view of religion as entirely non-cognitivist, see J.  Cottingham, ‘The lessons of life: 
Wittgenstein, religion and Analytic Philosophy’, in H-J. Glock and J.  Hyman  (eds), 
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on this point: the divine call is chiefly heard as a moral and practical as 
opposed to a theoretical or purely cognitive one. The reality which the 
patriarchs and prophets of the Hebrew bible and the key protagonists of 
the New Testament are made aware of is one that calls them to change 
their lives, to follow a certain path of righteousness, to hear the cry of the 
oppressed, to love one another, to forgive those who have wronged them, 
and so on through a long catalogue of luminous moral insights that form 
the living core of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.29
The upshot of this in theological terms is that however great the 
mystery of the divine nature may be, however much God is ‘invisible’, 
unable to be seen – or even named30 – by humankind, this much (in 
the Abrahamic tradition) is clear and central: God requires of us 
righteousness and mercy. To this extent God is, to use David Cooper’s 
term, ‘discursable’ – that is, there has to be something that can validly be 
said of God (and Cooper is quite correct in supposing that this is indeed 
my view).31 but how can the ineffable divine reality that transcends the 
human and natural worlds be, at least in its moral aspect, discursable? 
For those who subscribe to the three great Abrahamic faiths, the gap 
between the ineffable and the discursable is bridged by revelation; and 
indeed for the Christian, that discursability is offered in specifically 
human terms, through the Incarnation. To sceptical critics this may 
seem to be a fideistic retreat that puts the whole matter beyond rational 
philosophical discussion; but before I close by tackling this worry, I want 
to turn briefly to a different but in some ways parallel problem that besets 
the alternative worldview espoused by Cooper.
The idea, canvassed a  moment ago, that religion characteristically 
integrates the cosmological and the moral domains, raises the following 
question about impersonalist outlooks such as buddhism and Daoism: 
if reality is simply a ceaseless flow of conditions that arise and pass away, 
and if individual selves have no real existence, but are merely an illusion 
arising from temporary configurations within that never-ending flow, 
Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P.M.S. Hacker (oxford: oxford 
university Press, 2009), pp. 203-227.
29 This paragraph is from my paper ‘Conversion, Self-Discovery and moral Change’, 
forthcoming in I. Dalferth (ed.), Conversion, Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of 
religion (Tübingen: mohr Siebeck, 2012).
30 Compare the famous passage in the Hebrew bible (exodus 3:14), when God refuses 
to name himself to moses, saying only Ehyeh asher ehyeh, ‘I am that I am.’
31 Cooper, ‘living with mystery’, p. 5.
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then why should any particular moral response be demanded of us? 
It is of course true that the buddha and other eastern sages enjoined 
compassion; but they also pointed to the need to escape from the suffering 
that is inseparable from the endless cycle of coming to be and perishing. 
So is not entirely clear on this view why an active life of helping others, 
for example, or a determination to fight for justice, should be incumbent 
upon us any more than, for example, simply cultivating a  trance-like 
state of detachment.
In a sensitive passage in which he takes up something like this worry, 
Cooper suggests that the Daoist sage will lead a  life that somehow 
‘emulates the ineffable’. In other words, he will bring his own life into line 
with an ultimate reality that resists all confining and classification:
As the wellspring of everything [dao] cannot be bound by anything 
outside itself, and is therefore without any obstacles to overcome, and 
devoid of partiality and aggressive purpose. Dao, therefore, invites 
figurative description as ‘gentle’, ‘spontaneous’ and ‘non-contending’ ... 
The sage adopts the way of wu wei, literally ‘non-action’, but in effect 
a  spontaneous, responsive style of living that eschews the rules and 
goals that constrain most people’s behaviour and encourage them to be 
aggressive and contentious.32
Cooper readily acknowledges that this does not amount to 
a demonstrative argument that a certain kind of life is mandatory for the 
Daoist; but he suggests that one who is attuned to the nature of reality 
disclosed by the Daoist worldview will naturally and spontaneously tend 
to respond with this kind of gentle comportment towards the world and 
towards one’s fellows.
by their fruits shall ye know them. It would be absurd, as well as 
distasteful, to try to disparage such a vision on philosophical grounds; 
the worth of a religion must be tested, in large part, by looking at the 
lives of its practitioners. And in any case, the appeal of the respective 
types of worldview, theistic versus impersonalist, cannot in my view 
be properly evaluated in an academic discussion, any more than one 
could evaluate the merits of marriage versus priestly celibacy from the 
outside, by clinically inspecting the theoretical assumptions of each 
form of life. To appreciate a form of life and its associated worldview one 
has to understand how it is shaped from the inside – how the multiple, 
32 Cooper, ‘living with mystery’, p. 8.
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mutually reinforcing strands of practice and thought and emotion and 
interpersonal interaction combine to condition, slowly and gradually, 
one’s passage through life. but what can perhaps be said, looking at the 
buddhist and Daoist pictures from within the alterative presuppositions 
of the theistic outlook, is that it is fearfully hard to see how morality can 
retain its normative resonance and power if it is severed from the idea 
of personal response that is so central to traditional (Judaeo-Christian) 
theism: the face-to-face encounter that reveals us to each other not 
as mere temporary eddies in a ceaseless flow of changing conditions, but as 
unique beings, loved into existence, and bearing ultimate responsibility 
for every single act or failure to act that marks out our short time here.
let me come finally to the problem of the transition, on the theistic 
picture, from ineffable ultimate reality to the idea of the divine as 
discursable – discursable, that is, in so far as it is taken to be wholly 
good and just and merciful, and to require a  corresponding moral 
response from each of us. Can that transition be made only by reliance 
on revelation, which in turn involves a long jump beyond reason into the 
domain of pure faith? This of course is far too vast a topic to be explored 
properly at this closing stage of the argument (though I have started to 
tackle it in other work).33 let me just say this: that the theistic picture is 
often, I think, unfairly lumbered with a false dichotomy: either we have 
to rely on the impartially assessable arguments of natural theology which 
ought, if they are worth their salt, to give us transparent truths about God 
that command the assent of any rational inquirer; or we have to depend 
on miraculous supernatural revelation, the evidence for which is by its 
nature likely to be questionable, or unlikely to convince the detached 
scientific assessor, and which therefore has to be accepted on faith.
The way out of this dilemma, I suggest, is to see that there many aspects 
of our human experience that function, if you will, as a kind of bridge 
between two types of evidence: the neutral, scientifically evaluable data 
that is available via the use of our ordinary natural faculties, and the more 
controversial disclosures that seem to depend on divine intervention 
or the gracious bestowal of something extraordinary and special. As 
examples of this kind of intermediate or ‘bridging’ evidence, consider 
the ‘transcendent’ moments that very many people will from time to 
time have experienced – the times when the drab, mundane pattern of 
33 See the final section of John Cottingham, ‘The Source of Goodness’, in Harriet 
Harris (ed.), God, Goodness and Philosophy (london: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 49-62.
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our ordinary routines gives way to something vivid and radiant, and we 
seem to glimpse something of the beauty and significance of the world 
we inhabit. Wordsworth expressed it as follows, in a famous passage in 
The Prelude:
There are in our existence spots of time, 
That with distinct pre-eminence retain 
A renovating virtue, whence – depressed 
by false opinion and contentious thought, 
or aught of heavier or more deadly weight, 
In trivial occupations, and the round 
of ordinary intercourse – our minds 
Are nourished and invisibly repaired; 
A virtue, by which pleasure is enhanced, 
That penetrates, enables us to mount, 
When high, more high, and lifts us up when fallen.34
What ‘lifts us up’ is the sense that our lives are not just a disorganized 
concatenation of contingent episodes, but that they are capable of fitting 
into a pattern of meaning, where responses of joy and thankfulness35 and 
compassion and love for our fellow creatures are intertwined; and where 
they make sense because they reflect a  splendour and a  richness that 
is not of our own making. Notice that this kind of ‘transfiguration’ is 
not a ‘religious experience’, if that latter term is understood in the rather 
narrow way that has become common in our culture, when philosophers 
speak, for example, of the ‘argument from religious experience’. What is 
often meant under this latter heading is some kind of revelation which 
is taken to be evidence for, or to validate, the supposed truths of some 
particular creed or cult – a vision of the Virgin mary, for example, or 
the sense, reported by William James, of ‘the close presence of a  sort 
of mighty person’.36 This kind of notion is I think uppermost in many 
people’s minds when they insist that they have never had a  ‘religious 
34 William Wordsworth, The Prelude, 12, 208-218 [1805 edition].
35 Interestingly, David Cooper has written of the need to allow ourselves to experience 
natural beauty as a gift: ‘allowing things to be experienced as the “gifts” they are’. This 
seems to imply a  thankfulness not entirely in place for those espousing a neutral and 
impersonalist world view – unless the inverted commas around ‘gift’ signal merely that 
as the world is to be experienced as if it were a gift. See David e. Cooper, A Philosophy of 
Gardens (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 160.
36 James, Varieties of Religious Experience, Ch. 3, p. 75 (reporting the experience of one 
of his correspondents).
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experience’. by contrast, the kinds of ‘transcendent’ experience described 
by Wordsworth and many other writers involve not so much a revelation 
of supernatural entities, but rather a  heightening, an intensification, 
that transforms the way in which we experience the world. The term 
‘transcendent’ seems appropriate not in the sense that there is necessarily 
an explicit invocation of metaphysical objects that transcend ordinary 
experience, but rather because the categories of our mundane life undergo 
a radical shift: there is a sudden irradiation that discloses a beauty and 
goodness, a meaning, that was before occluded.37 
many other examples could be given, including the ‘sacred’ dimension 
in works of great music, of which roger Scruton has eloquently spoken;38 
another important case is the sense of awe which Immanuel Kant and 
many others have felt before the majesty of the moral law, which seems 
to demand our allegiance irrespective of our personal inclinations or 
desires.39 In these and many other cases, we experience what I would 
call natural intimations of the transcendent. They are, if you like, natural 
glimpses of the divine, which shine through from the ineffable source of 
our being to the human world we inhabit.40
Nothing, of course, compels us to interpret them that way. The 
philosophy of the past two or three hundred years has seen an increasing 
determination to try to ‘desacralize’ such experiences, to deny that 
they give us access to an eternal and objective source of meaning and 
value, and to reduce them instead to mere endogenous disturbances, 
subjective by-products of biological or evolutionary processes, or 
projections stemming from merely human convention or conditioning. 
Such reductive strategies are often deployed with fearsome philosophical 
37 This paragraph is taken from my ‘Confronting the Cosmos: Scientific rationality 
and Human understanding’, forthcoming in Proceedings of the ACPA (Philosophy 
Documentation Center), (August 2012). For further development of these notions, see 
my Why Believe? (london: Continuum, 2009), passim.
38 Describing the experience of a  great work of music, Scruton speaks of ‘sacred’ 
moments, moments ‘outside time, in which the deep loneliness and anxiety of the human 
condition is overcome’, and ‘the human world is suddenly irradiated from a point beyond 
it’. roger Scruton, ‘The Sacred and the Human’ (2010) <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/
gifford/2010/the-sacred-and-the-human> [accessed 30 march 2010].
39 See I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason [Kritik der Practischen Vernunft, 1788], transl. 
T. K. Abbott (london: longmans, 1873, 6th edn 1909), antepenultimate paragraph.
40 See further John Cottingham, ‘Human Nature and the Transcendent’, in C. Sandis 
and m. Cain (eds), Human Nature. royal Institute of Philosophy supplement (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2012).
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ingenuity, but it is doubtful if they can survive the ‘test of integrity’ outside 
the seminar room. For when we open ourselves to these experiences 
with  the right degree of attentiveness and receptivity, we seem over-
whelmingly to be carried towards something beyond ourselves, to be 
‘lifted up’ by a splendour and beauty and richness more enduring than 
anything merely mundane and contingent. For the religious believer, the 
natural way of expressing all this will be in the kind of language deployed 
by John Paul II: ‘In the midst of these wonders we discover the voice of 
the Creator, transmitted by heaven and earth, day and night: a language 
“without words whose sound is heard”, capable of crossing all frontiers.’41
The reference to the sound going forth throughout the world, crossing 
all frontiers, picks up on an ancient theme from the Psalms about the 
universal wordless language of the Creator heard in nature: ‘the heavens 
declare the glory of the lord.’ And the crucial philosophical point here 
is that we do not have to rely on special revelations, or the particular 
claims of any given faith tradition, since our natural human experiences 
of overwhelming beauty in the natural world (and the same can be said 
about the commanding authority of the moral law)42 – these ordinary 
human modes of response give us access to evidence that we cannot in 
integrity ignore.
one cannot of course expect this appeal to the character and the 
phenomenology of our human experience to cause a mass conversion 
from Daoism to theism, let alone to cut any ice with the militant 
secularist, who is worlds away from either. but coercive arguments, 
whether demonstrative or probabilistic, are very rarely found in the 
philosophy of religion (and in my view they occur far less frequently in 
the rest over-whelmingly of philosophy than is generally supposed).43 Yet 
to forego any claim to coercive arguments in this area emphatically does 
not entail that we have abandoned rationality or retreated to a narrow 
fideism. The experiences are there to be had, if we have the openness 
and integrity to acknowledge them; and they are not the prerogative of 
41 John Paul II, ‘ecological Conversion’, (General audience address, 17 January 2001).
42 It is significant that Psalm 19 [18] Caeli enarrant (‘The heavens declare the glory of 
the lord’) moves seamlessly from awestruck wonder at the beauties of the natural world 
to equal wonder at the awesomeness of the moral law – a  transition that undoubtedly 
inspired Kant’s famous linkage of the ‘starry heavens’ and the ‘moral law’ as both filling the 
mind with awe (Achtung); Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, antepenultimate paragraph.
43 See John Cottingham, ‘What is Humane Philosophy and Why is it At risk?’, 
Philosophy, Supplement 65 (2009), 1-23; and A. o’Hear (ed.), Conceptions of Philosophy, 
royal Institute of Philosophy series (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2009).
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any cosy club of insiders or the ‘saved’, but a natural part of our ordinary 
human birthright. So if, as human beings, we cannot hope to encompass 
or explain the fearful mystery of existence, perhaps we can at least 
glimpse something of its enduring beauty and goodness.
